Tuesday, September 25, 2007
China, US delicately juggle Taiwan
By Jing-dong Yuan, Sep 25, 2007
Asia Times Online
MONTEREY, California - Taiwan's bid for United Nations membership has again been rejected, action that was hailed by Beijing as a reaffirmation of the "one China" position and its claim of sovereignty over the island. However, the situation remains tenuous.
Taiwan's attempts for UN membership began in 1993 when the government of president Lee Teng-hui sought a seat in the international body under the name of the Republic of China (ROC). But this time the Chen Shui-bian administration sought to enter under the name "Taiwan", a provocative move that has incurred strong condemnation and even strong warnings from Washington. Even the Nationalist (Kuomintang) party, not to be outdone by Chen, called for its own referendum to return to the UN under the name "Republic of China".
These developments constitute serious challenges to both mainland China and the administration of US President George W Bush. For Washington, these are issues of commitments, priorities, and its relationship with Beijing.
For obvious reasons, Bush administration officials are concerned that Chen's move could provoke China to resort to "non-peaceful" means under its 2005 Anti-Secession Law in reaction to what is seen as attempts toward de jure independence. This in turn raises questions about US commitments to the defense of Taiwan under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.
However, these commitments are to be honored only if there is unequivocal and unprovoked unilateral use of force against Taiwan by mainland China, not a carte blancheto Taipei regardless of what it does. Indeed, in recent years, the Bush administration has on many occasions stated that it is opposed to any unilateral change of the status quo by either side of the Taiwan Strait.
Within this context, Bush administration officials have become increasingly worried about Chen's apparent attempts to change the status quo and issued several warnings in recent months. US deputy assistant secretary of state Thomas Christensen, speaking at the US-Taiwan Business Council this month, warned Taipei against "needlessly provocative behavior" and expressed serious US concerns over the issue of name change in an upcoming referendum. While affirming US commitments to and friendship with Taiwan, he also emphasized that Washington would not "let Taipei define our position".
That Washington is so adamant and open on this issue is dictated by its priorities elsewhere, namely the war on terrorism and its quagmire in Iraq, and other strategically more urgent problems such as Iran's nuclear developments and the situation in the Middle East. The US can hardly afford being distracted by another crisis across the Taiwan Strait. It is therefore annoyed by what it sees as political posturing, unnecessary provocation, and potentially harmful actions against US interests.
US reactions to the referendum issue are also indicative of its changing relationship with China. The Bush administration came into office more than six years ago viewing China as a strategic competitor and determined to strengthen its alliances in Asia and support Taiwan in an effort to contain the rise of China. The events of September 11, 2001, changed that early assessment and have given Washington a different set of priorities. The administration has since redefined its strategic interests and recognizes the need for closer cooperation with Beijing.
The Sino-US relationship has evolved into one characterized as cooperative, constructive and candid or, to quote President Bush, "complex". Beijing and Washington cooperate on a whole range of issues, from the North Korean and Iranian nuclear challenges, to the environment and global warming, to the "global war on terrorism". China and the US have become ever more interdependent economically, with bilateral trade surpassing US$300 billion this year.
Both have come to recognize the importance of handling the delicate Taiwan issue. Washington seeks to maintain the status quo so it can stay focused on its "war on terrorism" and on combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beijing recognizes the role that the US can play in reining in Taiwanese independence even as it continues its military preparation to deter and respond to such a scenario.
But Beijing is facing a serious challenge. It is quite clear that Chen Shui-bian's referendum plan is largely driven by Taiwan's election politics as much as by Chen's own craving for personal legacy. It is also obvious that despite serious warnings from both Washington and Beijing, the referendum is most likely going to take place. How Beijing should react is a test for the mainland leadership's acumen as well as resolve.
Handled well, the impact of the pending crisis could be absorbed, leaving maximum flexibility without either losing face or losing tempers. This is crucial in particular given the pending 2008 Summer Olympic Games and China's international reputation as a rising power.
For Beijing, there are three principles to keep in mind. The first is that Chen's motive for holding the referendum is to provoke. Overreaction hands Chen the very prize he seeks. And while the 2005 Anti-Secession Law defines the overall parameter of what is tolerable and what is not, Beijing should leave itself open to an extremely flexible interpretation.
Second, time is on the mainland's side. The fact that Chen has sought all kinds of tactics to push the edge of the envelope concerning de jure independence demonstrates his frustration over the futility of such attempts and the fear that such independence is becoming increasingly elusive for Taiwan. The mainland and the island have become economically more dependent, and many Taiwanese business people and the public in general prefer the status quo to uncertain and unpredictable change. Indeed, cross-Strait trade continues to expand; the first nine months of 2007 have already seen a 13% increase over the same period last year, and total two-way trade for 2007 is projected to reach US$110 billion, with the balance heavily favoring Taiwan. This is what worries Chen.
Finally, Beijing should be sanguine about the US role. While Washington is opposed to any unilateral change of the status quo and hence has strongly criticized Chen's referendum move, it does not share completely Beijing's vision for unification. The US continues to offer arms sales to Taiwan, with the most recently announced possible deals worth more than $2.2 billion, including P-3C Orion anti-submarine patrol aircraft and SM-2 anti-aircraft missiles. There are also reports of possible US sales of F-16s to Taiwan.
Clearly, US interests remain a Taiwan separated from the mainland. Herein lies the limitation to what Beijing can expect of Washington.
Dr Jing-dong Yuan is director of the East Asia non-proliferation program at the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies and associate professor of international policy studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Asia Times Online
MONTEREY, California - Taiwan's bid for United Nations membership has again been rejected, action that was hailed by Beijing as a reaffirmation of the "one China" position and its claim of sovereignty over the island. However, the situation remains tenuous.
Taiwan's attempts for UN membership began in 1993 when the government of president Lee Teng-hui sought a seat in the international body under the name of the Republic of China (ROC). But this time the Chen Shui-bian administration sought to enter under the name "Taiwan", a provocative move that has incurred strong condemnation and even strong warnings from Washington. Even the Nationalist (Kuomintang) party, not to be outdone by Chen, called for its own referendum to return to the UN under the name "Republic of China".
These developments constitute serious challenges to both mainland China and the administration of US President George W Bush. For Washington, these are issues of commitments, priorities, and its relationship with Beijing.
For obvious reasons, Bush administration officials are concerned that Chen's move could provoke China to resort to "non-peaceful" means under its 2005 Anti-Secession Law in reaction to what is seen as attempts toward de jure independence. This in turn raises questions about US commitments to the defense of Taiwan under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.
However, these commitments are to be honored only if there is unequivocal and unprovoked unilateral use of force against Taiwan by mainland China, not a carte blancheto Taipei regardless of what it does. Indeed, in recent years, the Bush administration has on many occasions stated that it is opposed to any unilateral change of the status quo by either side of the Taiwan Strait.
Within this context, Bush administration officials have become increasingly worried about Chen's apparent attempts to change the status quo and issued several warnings in recent months. US deputy assistant secretary of state Thomas Christensen, speaking at the US-Taiwan Business Council this month, warned Taipei against "needlessly provocative behavior" and expressed serious US concerns over the issue of name change in an upcoming referendum. While affirming US commitments to and friendship with Taiwan, he also emphasized that Washington would not "let Taipei define our position".
That Washington is so adamant and open on this issue is dictated by its priorities elsewhere, namely the war on terrorism and its quagmire in Iraq, and other strategically more urgent problems such as Iran's nuclear developments and the situation in the Middle East. The US can hardly afford being distracted by another crisis across the Taiwan Strait. It is therefore annoyed by what it sees as political posturing, unnecessary provocation, and potentially harmful actions against US interests.
US reactions to the referendum issue are also indicative of its changing relationship with China. The Bush administration came into office more than six years ago viewing China as a strategic competitor and determined to strengthen its alliances in Asia and support Taiwan in an effort to contain the rise of China. The events of September 11, 2001, changed that early assessment and have given Washington a different set of priorities. The administration has since redefined its strategic interests and recognizes the need for closer cooperation with Beijing.
The Sino-US relationship has evolved into one characterized as cooperative, constructive and candid or, to quote President Bush, "complex". Beijing and Washington cooperate on a whole range of issues, from the North Korean and Iranian nuclear challenges, to the environment and global warming, to the "global war on terrorism". China and the US have become ever more interdependent economically, with bilateral trade surpassing US$300 billion this year.
Both have come to recognize the importance of handling the delicate Taiwan issue. Washington seeks to maintain the status quo so it can stay focused on its "war on terrorism" and on combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beijing recognizes the role that the US can play in reining in Taiwanese independence even as it continues its military preparation to deter and respond to such a scenario.
But Beijing is facing a serious challenge. It is quite clear that Chen Shui-bian's referendum plan is largely driven by Taiwan's election politics as much as by Chen's own craving for personal legacy. It is also obvious that despite serious warnings from both Washington and Beijing, the referendum is most likely going to take place. How Beijing should react is a test for the mainland leadership's acumen as well as resolve.
Handled well, the impact of the pending crisis could be absorbed, leaving maximum flexibility without either losing face or losing tempers. This is crucial in particular given the pending 2008 Summer Olympic Games and China's international reputation as a rising power.
For Beijing, there are three principles to keep in mind. The first is that Chen's motive for holding the referendum is to provoke. Overreaction hands Chen the very prize he seeks. And while the 2005 Anti-Secession Law defines the overall parameter of what is tolerable and what is not, Beijing should leave itself open to an extremely flexible interpretation.
Second, time is on the mainland's side. The fact that Chen has sought all kinds of tactics to push the edge of the envelope concerning de jure independence demonstrates his frustration over the futility of such attempts and the fear that such independence is becoming increasingly elusive for Taiwan. The mainland and the island have become economically more dependent, and many Taiwanese business people and the public in general prefer the status quo to uncertain and unpredictable change. Indeed, cross-Strait trade continues to expand; the first nine months of 2007 have already seen a 13% increase over the same period last year, and total two-way trade for 2007 is projected to reach US$110 billion, with the balance heavily favoring Taiwan. This is what worries Chen.
Finally, Beijing should be sanguine about the US role. While Washington is opposed to any unilateral change of the status quo and hence has strongly criticized Chen's referendum move, it does not share completely Beijing's vision for unification. The US continues to offer arms sales to Taiwan, with the most recently announced possible deals worth more than $2.2 billion, including P-3C Orion anti-submarine patrol aircraft and SM-2 anti-aircraft missiles. There are also reports of possible US sales of F-16s to Taiwan.
Clearly, US interests remain a Taiwan separated from the mainland. Herein lies the limitation to what Beijing can expect of Washington.
Dr Jing-dong Yuan is director of the East Asia non-proliferation program at the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies and associate professor of international policy studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Labels: Taiwan
¶ 9:01 AM
