Failure to engage Suu Kyi dismays China

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007

Labels: Burma

  ¶ 11:50 AM 0 comments

  Thailand a key to new Myanmar sanctions Oct 4, 2007, Asia Times Online
By Andrew Symon

BANGKOK –As international condemnation mounts against Myanmar's military government and its recent armed crackdown on street demonstrators, the country's money-spinning oil-and-gas sector could soon be the target of new and tighter Western-led sanctions. Should new bans on energy trade and investment come to pass, more than any other regional country Thailand will find itself caught between a diplomatic rock and an economic hard place.

Natural gas exports to Thailand are by far the Myanmar government's largest source of foreign revenues, accounting for nearly US$160 million per month in take-or-pay contracts negotiated before the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis - and well before the recent spike in global energy prices. According to statistics from the Asian Development Bank, gas exports contribute nearly one-third of Myanmar's total official export revenues. And there are several big new bilateral investment plans underway to pump up further natural gas and electricity exports from Myanmar to Thailand.

Under former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Thailand came under US criticism for expanding its business ties with Myanmar's junta. His government's so-called "forward engagement" policy towards Myanmar was out of line with US- and European-led trade and investment sanctions, but was in accord with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which, since admitting Myanmar into the grouping in 1997, had preferred economic engagement over isolationism to influence the regime.

After the recent military crackdown, however, ASEAN has been openly critical, signaling to some analysts that the grouping might try to throw its lot in with whatever punitive measures Western countries may move to impose. However any meaningful collective action would need to include Thailand and it seems doubtful the country's interim military government would be willing to pull the plug on crucial energy supplies for morality's sake.

That means any new sanctions against Myanmar's energy industry are likely to have as marginal an impact on Myanmar's ruling junta's staying power as the punitive measures the US first imposed in 1997. China and India are both bidding to negotiate greater access to Myanmar's untapped energy resources. And both countries have notably refrained from criticizing the regime after last week's crackdown. Energy analysts note that if Thailand were to abandon its contractual arrangements in Myanmar, China and India would likely move to take up the slack.

Natural gas is Myanmar's hotly contested prize, with several regional countries bidding to explore new blocks up for tender. In the early 20th century Myanmar, then known as Burma, was an important regional oil producer from its deep onshore fields. However, oil production had dwindled in recent decades and large - although not massive - natural gas resources have more recently been discovered and foreign investments have helped to boost output.

New sanctions targeting existing rather than only new investments in Myanmar's energy industry would at least temporarily dent the regime's ability to profit from these resources. Potential targets of Western-led and ASEAN-upheld sanctions could hit some of the largest energy companies in the world, including France's Total, the US's Chevron, Malaysia's Petronas, South Korea's Daewoo and Korea Gas Corp, and, hypothetically, Thailand's PTT Exploration and Production (PTTEP).

There are also several small and medium sized Western upstream oil and gas companies - including so-called larrikin outfits - which currently operate below the political radar, but if forced to withdraw due to new sanctions on existing investments would at least temporarily disrupt Myanmar's ability to tap offshore wells, until China, India or another non-Western-aligned country moved in to fill the technology gap.

Energized competition

The politics of imposing new sanctions against Myanmar would be highly complex and potentially damaging to the Thai economy if Bangkok were to take part. Myanmar is already expanding its energy export base, emerging as a key new supplier to China and possibly also to India and South Korea. China and India are locked in competition for gas supply from fields now operated by South Korean companies offshore near western Myanmar.

China has secured at least the initial advantage for a gas pipeline plan approved by the Myanmar government to send supplies to southwest China and the idea for another pipeline taking product landed in Myanmar from Africa and the Middle East - giving China an additional supply route to the congested Malacca Strait - is also on the table.

India has mooted a similarly ambitious pipeline plan with Myanmar, which conceivably would send gas through Bangladesh and supply areas in eastern India. But it's still unclear if Dhaka, which has stonewalled other energy projects with India, would support any India-Myanmar initiative which passes through its territory.

Thailand's own supplies of natural gas, which currently fuel 65% of the country's total electricity output, are fast diminishing at a time industrial demand for the resource is simultaneously rapidly rising. According to BP figures, proven gas reserves in the Gulf of Thailand will likely run dry over the next 17 years. There are still untapped resources in the joint Thai-Malaysia development area as well as in the contested overlapping claims area with Cambodia - but even if maximized are not expected to bridge the emerging shortfall.

Meanwhile, state energy company PTT predicts that national natural gas demand will grow from 3.32 billion cubic feet per day (cfpd) at present to 6.1 billion cfpd by 2015. Thailand's power generation capacity, meanwhile, is projected to increase to 58,000 megawatts by 2021 from its current level 28,500 megawatts in the current power plan. Myanmar gas currently meets over 25% of total Thai demand and plans to steadily increase those volumes are now on the cards.

Gas is now piped from the offshore Yadana field, operated by France's Total in partnership with the US's Chevron, as well as from the offshore Yetagun field in the eastern Andaman Sea. These two fields alone supply an average of 900 million cfpd to Thailand. Volumes from those same fields are set to increase by another 300 million cfpd by 2011 in a big new offshore project operated by Thailand's PTTEP.

Additionally, there are a growing number of joint Thai-Myanmar hydropower projects planned or under development on the Salween River, which forms part of the shared border between the two countries. These include the 7,110 megawatt Tar-Hsan and 1,500 megawatt Hut Gyi dams, both of which were signed by Myanmar's junta and Thai companies, including the state-run monopoly the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand.

Both controversial projects are designed specifically to supply power to Thailand, but analysts say could conceivably be rerouted to China if Bangkok were to back new Western-led sanctions. China is currently backing other hydropower projects on the upper reaches of the same river designed to supply power to its fast growing south-western regions.

So far Thai officials have sent mixed signals about their intentions and have downplayed Thailand's significance to new sanctions imposed against the regime. Defense Minister Boonrawd Somtas told reporters that the current protests were unlikely to unseat Myanmar's junta and that political change was unlikely unless China, India and Russia exerted "serious pressure".

Meanwhile, top Thai energy official Piyasavati Amranand has said Myanmar's recent troubles have prevented his officials from negotiating any new gas supply deals and that any planned talks would be delayed until the political situation stabilizes. At the same time, he said that Thailand's intention to secure new natural gas supplies from Myanmar remains unchanged.

Andrew Symon is a Singapore-based journalist and analyst specializing in energy and mining issues.

Labels: Burma

  ¶ 10:30 AM 0 comments

  制裁緬甸與否　泰國左右為難 撰文 Andrew Symon，亚洲时报
2007/10/05, 週五

曼谷 --- 鑒於緬甸軍政府武力鎮壓反政府示威的行徑，持續遭到國際社會的譴責和壓力，緬甸的油氣產業有可能成為西方國家下一輪經濟制裁的打擊目標。一旦針對緬甸能源貿易和投資的禁令生效，泰國將會陷入外交經濟孰輕孰重的兩難困境。

對泰國出口天然氣，是緬甸至今最大的外匯收入來源。按照兩國在亞洲金融危機以前所簽訂的“照付不議”（take-or-pay，也譯“絕對付款”）合同，緬甸對泰國出口天然氣平均每月近1.6億美元。據亞洲開發銀行統計，天然氣出口約佔緬甸官方紀錄出口總收入的1/3。目前，緬甸和泰國仍在洽談多個有關天然氣和電力供應的雙向投資項目。

泰國前首相他信曾主張與緬甸軍政府積極發展經貿關係，受到美國的批評。他信政府對緬甸奉行的“進取交往”（forward engagement）外交政策，與歐美頒佈的貿易投資禁令相違背，但是卻符合東盟組織的政策。1997年東盟決定接納緬甸為成員國，希望通過經濟接觸而非政治孤立來對其施加影響。

但是最近緬甸當局軍事鎮壓和平示威者的做法，同樣遭到了東盟的公開批評，因此分析家認為，東盟很有可能配合西方國家，採取懲罰性的措施。不過，任何有意義的集體行動都需要泰國的參與，而泰國臨時軍政府未必會為了道德公義，而甘願切斷自己重要的能源供應。

換言之，和1997年美國率先頒佈的制裁措施一樣，新一輪制裁措施對緬甸軍政府的壓力，仍然是有限的。中國和印度正試圖在緬甸爭取更多的能源開發權，所以並未公開批評緬甸武力鎮壓示威之做法。分析家指出，如果泰國放棄與緬甸的能源供應合同，中國和印度就會趁虛而入、取而代之。

天然氣是各國在緬甸競爭最激烈的資源，目前多個國家都在競投緬甸新發現的氣田。20世紀初的緬甸，是地區內的石油主要輸出國。數十年來，緬甸石油產量不斷下降，但卻陸續發掘和開發天然氣資源。

假設西方國家和東盟的新制裁措施，同時針對緬甸已有的能源項目，而不是僅僅針對新投資項目，那麼緬甸當局在已有項目中的經濟收益，至少會在短期內減少。但與此同時，這些制裁也會打擊到某些能源巨頭公司，包括法國的道達爾（Total）、美國的雪佛龍（Chevron）、馬來西亞的Petronas、南韓的大宇（Daewoo）和韓國燃氣公司（Korea Gas Corp），甚至可能包括泰國的PTT Exploration and Production（PTTEP）石油公司。

另外，西方一些中小型的油氣開發公司，也在暗中與緬甸當局合作。如果它們在新制裁措施下被迫退出，緬甸開發離岸海上能源的能力將會被削弱，除非中國、印度或其它非西方國家主動填補這一技術空缺。

有關是否對緬甸實施新一輪制裁，涉及了十分複雜的政治問題；而且，如果曼谷當局參與其中，也可能會對泰國經濟帶來打擊。眼下，緬甸的能源出口量正逐漸擴大，可能成為中國、印度和南韓的重要供應來源。目前南韓公司已經取得了緬甸西部的幾塊近海氣田，而中印兩國也在爭相從這些氣田購買天然氣。

在現階段，中國稍佔上風。中國提出修建一條天然氣管道，從緬甸通往中國西南，這項目已經獲得緬甸政府的批准。另一條從非洲和中東延伸至緬甸的管道計劃，也提上了桌面討論；這條管道可為中國在擁擠的馬六甲海峽以外，多增加一條供應渠道。

另一方面，印度同樣提出了類似的天然氣管道方案，計劃從緬甸經過孟加拉，向印度東部地區輸送天然氣。不過，孟加拉政府曾就其他能源項目拒絕與印度合作，暫難知道它會否答允讓緬印管道通過其領土。

泰國國內開發的天然氣主要用於發電，而天然氣發電約占全國發電總量的65%。可是隨著其他工業對天然氣的需求迅速增長，泰國的天然氣供應，已越來越捉襟見肘。據統計，泰國灣水域已探明的天然氣資源，將在17年後枯竭。雖然泰國與馬來西亞之間的共同開發區，以及泰國與柬埔寨存在主權爭議的地區，還有未被開發的天然氣資源，但即使是最樂觀地估計其儲藏量，也無法彌補巨大的供應缺口。

泰國國家能源公司PTT預測，到2015年，國內的日均天然氣需求量，將從現在的33.2億立方英尺，增加到61億立方英尺。同時泰國還提出了目標，希望到2021年，將總發電量從目前的2.85萬兆瓦，提高至 5.8萬兆瓦。來自緬甸的天然氣，約佔泰國國內供應量的25%以上，而且泰國還計劃增加緬甸的天然氣進口。

目前，緬甸出口泰國的天然氣，主要取自安達曼海（Andaman Sea）東部由馬來西亞、日本和泰國PTTEP公司聯合營運的Yetagun氣田，以及由法國道達爾和美國雪弗龍聯合作業的亞達娜（Yadana）氣田。這兩大氣田平均每天向泰國供應9億立方英尺的天然氣，按計劃該數字到2011年還將提升到至12億立方英尺。

除此之外，泰國和緬甸在兩國邊界的薩爾溫江（Salween River）流域，還有多個擬建或在建的水電合作項目，其中包括7110兆瓦的Tar-Hsan水電站和1500兆瓦的Hut Gyi水電站。這些水電項目都是緬甸軍政府與泰國電力公司（包括泰國國家電力局）所簽訂的。

按計劃，Tar-Hsan和Hut Gyi水電站建成後，將向泰國輸電。分析家指出，如果當下泰國支持西方國家制裁緬甸，那麼這兩座水電站可能會改向中國供電。事實上，中國政府已計劃在薩爾溫江的上游地帶，修建水電項目，以滿足中國西南地區經濟發展的需求。

到目前為止，泰國政府仍然沒有對緬甸鎮壓一事表明立場，只稱泰國在制裁緬甸當局問題上，能夠發揮的作用有限。泰國國防部長桑塔斯（Boonrawd Somtas）對記者說，緬甸近日的反政府示威活動難以推翻軍政府，除非中國、印度和俄羅斯“強力施壓”。

不過，泰國負責能源問題的最高官員阿姆蘭南（Piyasavati Amranand）表示，由於緬甸國內政治動亂，他的下屬已無法同緬甸洽談新的天然氣供應項目，須待緬甸局勢穩定後繼續洽談。但他同時說，泰國從緬甸增加天然氣進口的意向，仍然不變。

楊洋編譯

Labels: Burma

  ¶ 10:28 AM 0 comments

  Why China has it wrong on Myanmar Oct 3, 2007, Asia Times Online
By Bernt Berger

While Myanmar's military government cracks down on peaceful protesters, China, as one of the regime's main benefactors, is being held in some quarters as tangentially co-responsible for the violence.

Although China's ability directly to influence the regime is limited, Beijing does maintain considerable diplomatic sway in Yangon, and whether it supports new mooted international initiatives against Myanmar's regime will likely determine their failure or success in affecting change.

China's stance on Myanmar is based on several misjudgments about the internal situation under the military regime and about Beijing's own international role. In his recent speech to the United Nations Security Council, Chinese Ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya admitted to problems in Myanmar. Yet he also expressed Beijing's belief that these problems did not constitute a threat to international peace and security and that in the current situation new Western-led sanctions against the regime were not useful.

That follows China's move in January to block a US-led initiative to put Myanmar's rights record on the UN Security Council's agenda. Last week, the United States and the European Union drafted a joint statement urging China, India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to use their influence in support of Myanmar's people to press for dialogue between the regime and the political opposition led by detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. So far, however, that call has gone unanswered.

Myanmar poses a growing challenge to China's international image, which Beijing is bidding to establish as a responsible global power. After its recent engagement in Sudan over Darfur backfired, Beijing finds itself once again associated with an abusive government that has manufactured a humanitarian crisis.

Although China is not the only country engaged in Myanmar and should not carry sole responsibility for the emerging crisis, it is a member of the UN Security Council and thereby indirectly accountable for any actions that are, or are not, taken. In view of a regime that unscrupulously mistreats its citizens and spurns with impunity all standards of civility, Beijing clearly lacks a sense of urgency.

Even before protesters took to the streets in September, there were rumors on the Yangon street that a popular uprising was in the cards. At the same time, China was gradually changing its approach toward Myanmar. For instance, in May a statement was posted on the Chinese Embassy's website criticizing the extraordinary expense of the establishment of Myanmar's new capital at Naypyidaw. China also initiated a behind-the-scenes meeting between Myanmar and US government representatives to discuss new directions in their severely strained relations.

Faced with the current crisis, however, China has reverted to its traditional stance of non-interference in another country's internal affairs. In doing so, Beijing is not only arguably damaging its international image, but also squandering a unique opportunity to take an active and moral role in influencing Myanmar's leadership. Globally, it could enhance its image considerably by acting as a responsible stakeholder. It could also distinguish itself from regional rival India, which so far has similarly preferred to deal with Myanmar's crisis by looking the other way.

The agreement to send UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari to Myanmar to meet with both military leaders and the pro-democracy opposition represents only a starting point toward internationally influencing the junta to change tack.

China's policymakers understand that the effectiveness of US-led sanctions has been undermined by Beijing's willingness to economically engage the regime. Indeed, Myanmar's military leadership has exhibited significant staying power in the face of economic sanctions, which in the main have hit the already poor and overburdened population and left the ruling junta unscathed. In the current situation, change can only come from within the military and China could use its channels, contacts and influence to convince the regime that now is the time to change.

Redefining interference

China has instead stood firm on its stated policy of non-interference in another country's internal affairs and has emphasized the need for restraint on both sides of the confrontation to ensure stability. However, China has in reality been interfering in Myanmar's internal affairs for at least half a century. During much of the Cold War, Beijing overtly supported the Communist Party of Burma, which fought against government-led forces. Burmese military leader General Ne Win reached a rapprochement with China in 1980, and Beijing has since been a strategic ally to different military governments.

China has invested heavily in Myanmar's infrastructure, business and natural resources and has tacitly supported the waves of migration of Chinese citizens into that country. By providing arms to the regime, Beijing has also disturbed government-society relations and helped to shift the center of political power toward the military. This kind of interference is no different from Western approaches to maintaining influence in their former colonies, and without a change in policy, China will continue to be subjected to accusations of neo-colonialism.

Interference no longer narrowly implies the disturbance of a smaller country's political and economic development, as it arguably did across the developing world during the Cold War. Today, the conviction in the West and many parts of the developing world is that social rights are integral to political stability and development. Indeed, the lack of interference into a rogue regime's internal affairs can have important humanitarian and developmental implications for the global community. Insistence on human rights and development is not just a way to pressure abusive governments, but because of spillover effects, is increasingly important to maintaining global security.

Nonetheless, Beijing frowns on any external intervention toward Myanmar, including a multilateral response led by the UN, because of the precedent it would set. Observers have argued that Beijing fears a similar fate if in future it proves unable to manage the rising number of internal challenges it faces.

However, despite its own spotty human-rights record, today China's pragmatic Communist Party leadership is not viewed as darkly as the likes of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, Myanmar's General Than Shwe or other rogue governments with which Beijing is known to have close ties. There are no serious external initiatives to promote regime change in China, and whatever international action is taken toward Myanmar's military junta is unlikely to set any precedent for future action against Beijing.

China has recently said that no country in Myanmar's immediate neighborhood seriously believes that the recent anti-government protests represent a threat to regional stability and security. Yet even before last week's crackdown on demonstrators, some ASEAN members had come around to view Myanmar as more of a liability than an asset to the grouping's international standing.

Despite several diplomatic overtures, Myanmar has steadfastly ignored ASEAN's urgings to improve its human-rights record and move toward more democracy. The grouping's condemnation of recent events underscored its members' growing frustration with the military regime and mounting concerns that Myanmar's obstinacy could undermine efforts under way to become a more rules-based organization.

If China's influence is to transcend merely maintaining good commercial relations with regional governments, its handling of the crisis in Myanmar represents an important test case. Yet all indications so far are that China aims to support the status quo in Myanmar, reaffirming global perceptions that Beijing's foreign policy is guided almost exclusively in pursuit of its narrowly defined economic interests. Beijing clearly fears that international pressure on Myanmar's leadership or possible regime change would harm its economic interests, including in particular its privileged access to the country's energy and natural resources.

After the Cold War, Myanmar's leaders learned to survive by strategically playing their neighbors, namely India and China, against one another as they competed for access to Myanmar's resources. The ideal scenario now would be for China and India to join forces with the West in demanding political change in Myanmar. If China appears now as a progressive force toward influencing political change in Myanmar, potential future democratic governments will be less likely to exclude Beijing from their list of preferred trading partners.

China is Myanmar's biggest neighbor and will inevitably remain a factor in the country's future. In the event of possible regime change, presumably where the military is knocked from power, any new government would be well placed to leverage China's financial resources and technical expertise in managing the transition. Yet any democratic-minded government that rises in Myanmar will no doubt lean toward the US and Europe - which have long maintained economic sanctions against the military regime - at China's expense.

China's accustomed role of blocking UN Security Council resolutions that involve sanctions or interventions against abusive regimes no longer necessarily reflects the spirit among other UN member states from the developing world. Today, many countries, rich and poor, stand for democratization, human rights and good governance and are ready to condemn regimes such as Myanmar that routinely flout those ideals. It's a global reality that China's leadership has, to its international detriment, failed to embrace.

Bernt Berger is a research fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg (IFSH) and associate researcher of the Institute for Asian Studies at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA).

Labels: Burma

  ¶ 1:27 PM 0 comments

  緬甸危機：王光亞誤判形勢？ 撰文 Bernt Berger，亚洲时报
2007/10/04, 週四

鎮壓緬甸和平示威者是在緬甸軍政府，但軍政權主要資助者之一的中國，某程度上也被視為緬甸暴力鎮壓的共犯。雖說中國對緬甸軍政府的直接影響有限，但北京在仰光確擁有相當的外交影響力。北京是否支持國際社會對緬甸軍政府的新制裁，很可能成為國際社會是否能夠左右影響當地局勢的關鍵。

中國當前對緬甸的立場，是由於它誤判了軍政權統治下的緬甸局勢，也誤判了它自身的國際角色。中國駐聯合國大使王光亞最近在聯合國安理會承認緬甸存在問題，但同時表示，中國相信這些問題並未對國際和平與安全構成威脅，而在當前局勢下，西方即使對緬甸政權作出新一輪制裁，也不會起作用。

王光亞的聲明並不奇怪。此前，中國也曾在1月反對安理會按美國提議，在會上討論緬甸人權問題。上周，美國和歐盟起草了一份聯合聲明，敦促中國、印度和東盟利用自身的影響力，支持緬甸人民提出的要求，即要求軍政權與被拘押的反對派領導人昂山素季（Aung San Suu Kyi）舉行政治對話。然而，這一呼籲迄今仍未得到回應。

當下中國正努力塑造自身作為負責任大國的形象，但緬甸問題正日益損害中國的國際形象。由於蘇丹爆發達富爾人道災難，中國已經因為與蘇丹政府走得太近而嚴重損害了自身形象。如今，北京又一次與製造人道危機的殘暴政權（緬甸）拉上關係。

雖說中國不是唯一與緬甸軍政權親近的國家，而且也不應為緬甸正在出現的危機承擔全部責任，但中國是安理會常任理事國，因此要為任何已經採取或未能採取的行動，承擔間接責任。緬甸軍政權凌虐國民之舉令人髮指，也蔑視一切文明標準，北京應該儘快認識到問題的迫切性。

早在緬甸示者在五月走上街頭之前，仰光大街小巷就盛傳一場人民起義在醞釀中。與此同時，中國也在逐漸改變對緬甸的立場。例如，中國大使館網站在五月刊登一份聲明，批評緬甸軍政府在內比都（Naypyidaw）建立新首都，是鋪張浪費的行為。中國還提議美國和緬甸代表舉行幕後會談，以討論雙方緊張關係的發展新方向。

然而，面對緬甸當前的危機，中國又回到“不干涉別國內政”這一傳統立場上。北京這麼做，可以說不僅有損其國際形象，而且也浪費了一次影響緬甸領導人、樹立自己道義形象的寶貴機會。從全球層面來看，中國本來可以藉此機會，顯示自己是一個負責任的國際社會成員，大大提高自己的國際形象。而且，中國還可與地區競爭對手印度形成對比，因為印度迄今同樣是無視緬甸危機。

聯合國特使甘巴里（Ibrahim Gambari）往緬甸會晤軍政府和民主反對派，只是國際社會努力促使軍政府改弦易轍的第一步。

北京的決策者很清楚，由於中國與緬甸軍政權的經濟關係，這些年來由美國領導的制裁行動，一直效果不彰。經濟制裁的確沒有對緬甸軍政府產生重大影響，遭受嚴重打擊的，是那些本已貧窮的窮人和大眾。

在當前形勢下，外界只能旨望緬甸軍政府內部產出變化。中國可以利用其管道、聯繫和影響力，讓緬甸軍政權相信：現在是要改變的時候了。

面對緬甸問題，中國一直堅持“不干涉別國內政”的政策，只是強調說，政府和反對派都要保持克制，以確保穩定。然而，中國干涉緬甸內政，其實至少有半個世紀的歷史了。

在冷戰期間的很長一段時間裏，北京公開支持緬甸共產黨與政府作對。緬甸前軍事領導人奈溫（Ne Win）將軍1980年與中國和解，北京此後一直是緬甸歷屆軍政府的戰略盟友。

目前，中國在緬甸基礎設施、商業和自然資源領域有大量投資，也默許大量中國公民向緬甸移民。北京還向緬甸提供大量武器，因而擾亂了政府與社會的關係，導致該國的政治權力中心向軍方轉移。中國的這種干涉政策，與西方在前殖民地維持影響力的方法並無不同。只要中國不改變政策，別人就會繼續指責中國推行新殖民主義。

在冷戰期間，“干涉”意味著破壞發展中世界小國的政治和經濟發展，但這種狹隘的意思，在今天已經過時。今天，西方和很多發展中國家都相信，社會權利是政治穩定和發展不可或缺的。事實上，如果不干涉流氓政權的內部事務，國際社會有可能會面臨人道災難和發展問題。堅持人權與發展並舉的政策，不僅是向殘暴政府施壓的一種方式，而且因其溢出效應，對維持全球安全也日益重要。

儘管如此，北京一直反對外界對緬甸的干涉，包括聯合國牽頭的多邊反應。北京之所以採取這種立場，是擔心國際社會樹立一個先例。觀察家指出，北京擔心要是有一天它無法應對內部日益增多的挑戰，也會面臨同樣的命運。

然而，儘管中國的人權記錄也不光彩，但中共領導人採取務實的外交政策，因此沒有在國際社會淪落到津巴布韋總統穆加貝（Robert Mugabe）、緬甸軍閥丹瑞（han Shwe）以及其他北京與之有密切關係的流氓政權領導人的地步。在中國以外，沒有人認真提出過，要促進中國的政權更替，因此不管國際社會對緬甸軍閥採取什麼行動，都不可能成為未來對北京採取行動的先例。

中國最近表示，緬甸的近鄰，都沒有把緬甸最近的反政府示威看作是對地區穩定與安全的威脅。但早在緬甸軍閥鎮壓示威者之前，東盟一些成員已把緬甸看作是影響該組織國際地位提升的累贅而不是資產。

緬甸政權雖作出了一些外交姿態，但對東盟要求它改善人權、走向民主化的呼籲充耳不聞。東盟最近對緬甸政權的譴責說明，東盟成員國已對緬甸軍政權日益失去信心，並越來越擔心，在東盟日益重視規則之際，緬甸會破壞該組織追求規範化的努力。

如果中國要想證明它在東南亞的影響力，超越單純與東盟地區政府維持良好的商業關係，那麼處理緬甸危機將是一塊試金石。然而，迄今的所有跡象顯示，中國的目標是維持緬甸的現狀，同時也再次證實了國際社會的看法：北京的外交政策，完全是為了追求狹隘的經濟利益。北京顯然擔心，國際社會對緬甸領導人施壓或該國政權更迭，都會傷害中國的經濟利益，特別是中國在緬甸能源等自然資源領域的利益。

冷戰結束後，緬甸領導人學會了打中國和印度這兩張戰略牌維持生存。緬甸領導人之所以能這麼做，是因為這兩個鄰居在爭奪緬甸的資源。如今的理想情景是，中印與西方一道，要求緬甸進行政治變革。如果中國現在在緬甸的政治變革進程中發揮積極的作用，日後緬甸民主政府把中國排除在貿易夥伴名單之外的可能性，也會低一些。

中國是緬甸的最大鄰居，因此不可避免地會對該國前途發揮重大影響。一旦發生政權更替、軍政權被推翻，新政府在過渡期間，將會很好地利用中國的金融資源和技術知識。但如果緬甸新建立的是民主政府，相信它會歐美傾斜，而與此同時，中國將會遭受損失。

中國一直習慣上阻撓安理會通過制裁或干涉各種殘暴政權的決議，然而時至今日，中國的這種做法未必代表發展中世界的心聲。今天包括富國和窮國在內的許多國家，都信奉民主、人權和良好政府等價值觀，因此隨時會譴責像緬甸這類時常踐踏這些理想的政權。這就是全球的現實情況，中國領導人沒有接受它，中國將會自食其果。

本文作者Bernt Berger是漢堡“和平與安全政策研究所”研究員，同時也是“德國全球和區域研究學院”亞洲研究部的研究員。

譯者：晏陽

Labels: Burma

  ¶ 1:23 PM 0 comments

  Monks in the vanguard for regime change By Brian McCartan
Sep 28, 2007, Asia Times Online

THREE PAGODAS PASS, Thailand-Myanmar border - Images of tens of thousands of red-robed monks have been broadcast across the world as Myanmar's Buddhist clergy ups the ante in what has become the largest demonstrations against military rule since the brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests in 1988.

Monk-led marches on Monday numbered more than 100,000 in the old capital Yangon, while demonstrations with clergy in the vanguard in other major cities tallied in the tens of thousands. Exile-run media reports claim that as many as eight monks have been killed in the violence, which started on Wednesday when soldiers for the first time opened fire on the protests in Yangon.

Early Thursday, soldiers raided Yangon's Ngwe Kyar Yan and Moe Guang monasteries, where they allegedly opened fire, physically assaulted and arrested an estimated 70 monks. Soldiers are now positioned at the front of temples to enforce the government's recent ban on gatherings of more than five people, and the number of protesters has reportedly dropped from Wednesday's figure.

That the leadership of what has evolved into a nationwide popular protest is in the hands of a religious institution that is generally perceived as above worldly concerns may seem odd to outsiders, but this is not the first time Buddhist monks have taken to the streets in Myanmar calling for political change. Indeed, there is a long tradition of political militancy in the monasteries of Myanmar.

Dating to the days of British overlordship in what was then known as Burma, monks have played a pivotal role in politics. Several of Burma's anti-colonial revolts were, at least partially, organized and led by the clergy. Prominent Buddhist anti-colonial leaders included the Venerable U Ottama and the Venerable U Wisara.

U Ottama organized the first anti-colonial activities under the General Council of Buddhist Associations in 1918, started the use of boycott campaigns and became the first Burmese citizen to be imprisoned by the British colonial authorities for a political speech he made in 1921. U Wisara died during the course of a 166-day hunger strike against the colonial regime.

The Saya San rebellion of 1930-31, which became the largest armed revolt against the colonial system in Burma, had a strong Buddhist element to it as well. Monks were actively involved in organizing the rebels of an insurrection that lasted more than two years, required almost 10,000 British troops to subdue and resulted in the deaths of about 10,000 Burmese, including the movement's leader, Saya San.

Monks were again actively involved in the pro-democracy uprising that swept the country in 1988. While most of the demonstrations were organized and led by university and high-school students, monks were crucial in maintaining discipline and giving their movement an important sense of moral legitimacy - though there were also reports of monks participating in retaliatory violence. When the killing began on August 8, 1988, many monks were among those gunned down by soldiers.

In October 1990, as a protest against the killings, disrobing and arrest of monks during the 1988 crackdown and continued harassment thereafter, monks in Mandalay declared an alms boycott against the generals and their families. The then-State Law and Order Restoration Council launched a crackdown and monasteries were raided and as many as 300 monks were forcibly disrobed and imprisoned.

Several of the ethnic insurgencies that have long fought against the government have also enlisted prominent monks as leaders. One, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), is still, at least officially, run by a Karen monk named U Thuzana. Although it is inclusive of Christians, U Thuzana has seen that the DKBA maintains a strong Buddhist slant to its policies. Meanwhile, the Pa-O resistance movement based in Shan state was also initially led by a Pa-O Buddhist monk, U Nay Mee.


Karmic arbiters

In recognition of the centrality of the Buddhist clergy, or Sangha, in Myanmar society, the ruling generals have tried to be frequently seen making contributions to building monasteries and pagodas and donating money and gifts to prominent monks. State-run media almost daily contain images and stories of military officers visiting monasteries and handing over gifts of cash and religious materials or conferring religious titles. The donations and conferring of titles is a rather materialistic attempt at co-opting the Sangha while attempting to portray to the public an image of moral legitimacy.

Tellingly, however, the Ministry of Religious Affairs is currently run by a military officer, Brigadier-General Thura Myint Maung. Scores of monks who have run afoul of the regime for expressing their political views in recent years have been disrobed and imprisoned. Of the current estimated 1,100 political prisoners, at least 90 of them are monks.

In Myanmar's Buddhist culture, men are expected to become a monk at least once in their lives, usually before they marry as well as after the death of their father. The clergy also plays animportant and overarching social-welfare role, often filling the gaps left by the lack of government-administered services. Young men often join the monkhood to gain access to education provided free of charge by the monasteries.

Because of the lack of opportunities elsewhere in Myanmar's mismanaged and tightly controlled economy, monasteries are also filled with disaffected young novices. The monastic environment itself provides a convenient place to discuss issues, including politics, and to hear the complaints and grievances of the common people who come to their temples seeking advice and religious solace. This has over the years made the monasteries a boiling cauldron of potential anti-government dissent.

The current protests, of course, were initially set off by a very worldly concern: a huge rise in the prices of fuel in mid-August that has significantly inflated the costs of basic goods and services. The initial demonstrations were spearheaded by known activists and former political prisoners.

But after a September 5 confrontation between the clergy and soldiers in the town of Pakokku in north-central Myanmar, in which several monks were badly beaten or arrested and soldiers fired warning shots, the Sangha has led what has morphed into a nationwide protest movement.

When the government failed to apologize for the assault, on September 18 monks declared a boycott on accepting alms from soldiers and their families, an act of defiance known in Myanmar as "overturning the alms bowl". That is why many monks marching in the demonstrations have carried their alms bowls upside down in a symbolic gesture.

This is a particularly powerful gesture, since it denies the soldiers and their families the ability to make merit - a very important part of life in religiously devout Myanmar. The involvement of the monks has given the protest movement a hard political bent, a significant evolution of the initial protests that were in response to fuel-price hikes.

The initial clergy calls for a government apology for soldiers' actions against monks at Pakokku has in recent days shifted to broader demands for dialogue between the government and opposition political parties, the release of political prisoners, and humanitarian demands for adequate food, shelter and clothing for the population.

Characteristic of most of the protests has been the willingness of ordinary citizens to march on either side of the monks in an effort to protect them from possible government violence. In one incident on Wednesday in the Yangon suburb of Ahlone, civilian protesters reportedly sat down around the monks and began praying even as the soldiers started to shoot.

With Wednesday's killing of several monks at Sule Pagoda in Yangon, the protest's demands have shifted again, with some monks now making calls for full-blown regime change. Video and photos of the marches placed on Internet weblogs showed agitated monks shouting slogans and brandishing poles on which they had tacked the Buddhist flag. Other demonstrations featured Buddhist flags raised together with banners emblazoned with the fighting peacock - a symbol of the pro-democracy opposition movement.

Now that the first shots have been fired, with as many as eight monks killed across the country and soldiers stationed in front of temples and monasteries, the issue has become whether the monks can sustain their protest movement. The power of Buddhism is strong in Myanmar, and the symbolism of soldiers gunning down monks could galvanize a broad-based insurrection.

Many hope that foot soldiers will balk at the next round of orders to open fire on monks, though there have been no signs yet of military desertions or breakdowns in the chain of command. What is clear is that the monks have captured the popular imagination, and with the clergy's brave example, people could soon be convinced that now is the time to take the nation's fate into their own worldly hands.

Brian McCartan is a Thailand-based freelance journalist. He may be contacted through brianpm@comcast.net.

Labels: Burma

  ¶ 8:01 AM 0 comments

  Total says pulling out would raise hardship

Labels: Burma

  ¶ 12:58 AM 0 comments

  法国道达尔否认将撤出缅甸 英国《金融时报》艾德•克鲁克斯(Ed Crooks)伦敦报道
2007年9月28日 星期五

法国石油集团道达尔(Total)对缅甸的局势“深表关注”，但否认该公司将撤出缅甸。道达尔在缅甸经营着一个天然气项目。

道达尔辩称，该公司在缅甸的业务为成千上万的人带来了好处，并且可以作为“想办法解决缅甸人权问题的商业和政治领袖”的榜样。

和美国的雪佛龙(Chevron)一样，道达尔也是一家仍活跃在缅甸的西方大公司。

英国的Premier Oil等西方公司已经从缅甸撤出。

但印度石油天然气集团(ONGC)和中国石油天然气集团公司(CNPC)都在增加在缅甸的投资。这两家公司都是国家控股的企业。

缅甸天然气资源丰富，甚至可以用庞大来形容。英国石油(BP)发布的《世界能源评估》(Review of World Energy)显示，在去年年底，缅甸已探明的天然气储量为5400亿立方米。

译者/李碧波

Labels: Burma

  ¶ 12:58 AM 0 comments